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DD/S 67-1287

Approved For Release 2001/08/16 : CIA-RDP81-00261R000100020010-2

4 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
Acting Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
✓ Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Survey of Technical Surveillance Counter-
measures

REFERENCES : (a) Memo dtd 15 Dec 66 to ExDir-Comp fr
25X1A [REDACTED], same subj

(b) Memo dtd 9 Feb 67 to DD/P and DD/S
fr DCI, same subj

(c) Memo dtd 28 Feb 67 to All Division and
Staff Chiefs fr DD/P, subj: Security of
[REDACTED]

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1. The comments of the DD/P, DD/S, and Acting DD/S&T on the subject survey have been reviewed with care. The following comments are keyed to the numbered recommendations in Section VII of the report of survey. It is recognized that events have in many cases overtaken this report and its recommendations and that a number of actions stimulated by it are in process.

(1) The Office of Security should request the additional positions and funds through the PPB process where they will compete with other priorities. OK

(2) Requests for funds should be submitted through the PPB process. The Director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting will be asked to give this request a high priority in the list of expenditures which may be undertaken with year-end funds.

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(3) While this subject is under study by the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, it is believed that a USIB-wide training program should be started soon, even if necessarily on a rather limited scale.

(4) The action taken by the DD/P and DD/S, as reflected in Reference (c) (attached), is responsive to this recommendation.

(5) The additional officers recommended should be requested through the normal PPB process.

(6) While this recommendation was agreed to in principle, the DD/S pointed out that a precise division of responsibility did not seem practicable. Since both OC and OS/TD are DD/S offices, it is left to his discretion as to how he will divide these responsibilities, with such assistance as may be required from the new unit established by the DD/P in Reference (c). The research and development problem is really a part of the Agency's over-all research and development problem, and no change in existing policy is to be made at this time.

(7) The new unit established by the DD/P in Reference (c) is approved in lieu of the special committee recommended herein.

(8) Approved.

(9) Approved to the extent that implementation is practicable.

(10) Approved.

(11) The principle advocated here is sound. It is believed, however, that the maximum approach recommended is neither necessary nor practicable. I am sure that the DD/P and DD/S subscribe to the general thrust of the recommendation and will act accordingly.

(12) We have no evidence that the offices of the Director and the DD/P and their conference rooms are sufficiently vulnerable at this time to take the action recommended.

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(13) Approved.

(14) While both DD/S and DD/P have some reservations about the practicability of this recommendation and the extent that it would be feasible, I am sure that both would agree with the thrust of the recommendation, i. e., to take all reasonable steps through the use of nullification devices.

(15) This recommendation is approved in principle. Funds and personnel, where appropriate, should be requested through the normal PPB process. The Director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting will be requested to place this requirement on the priority list for year-end funds.

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(18) Approved.

(19) Approved as a desirable objective. It is recognized that practical considerations may not permit full achievement. It is obviously desirable to schedule and gear technical inspections abroad to operational situations, which may vary from station to station.

(20) Approved.

(21) Approved.

(22) Approved.

(23) Approved.

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(24) Countermeasures research and development is a part of the Agency's over-all research and development problem. No specific action is directed at this time.

(25) Same as (24).

(26) Same as (24).

(27) Research and development projects should be monitored and evaluated on a continuing basis both by operating components and through the PPB mechanism. No useful purpose would seem to be served by establishing two years hence as the magic date on which an examination will be made.

(28) Approved.

(29) Approved.

(30) The importance of action on this recommendation is recognized by all. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee appears to be the proper interagency mechanism to recommend a course of action; the Committee is currently studying the matter.

(31), (32), and (33) Approved in principle. Implementation will, of course, depend upon the conditions at each station.

(34) The new unit established by DD/P in Reference (c) is requested to study this recommendation. The report in its present form should not be made available outside CIA.

(35) Approved in principle. The intended purpose may be better served by using the report as background and making appropriate modifications rather than by extracting portions of the report itself.

2. This report has stimulated a number of actions on problems which we have all recognized as important but to which we have not devoted adequate attention. This has been due in part to a lack of proper coordination and cooperation within the Agency. It is believed that Reference (c), to which both DD/P and DD/S subscribe, establishes a workable and satisfactory organizational arrangement to

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ensure that technical countermeasures receive the attention they deserve. All components are enjoined to lend every possible assistance to [REDACTED] in this effort.

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3. Allocation of responsibility for countermeasures research and development must receive further attention during the coming weeks. This is an integral part of the problem the Agency faces concerning the allocation of responsibilities for our entire research and development effort and will be dealt with as a part of that problem.

25X1A

[REDACTED]
L. K. White
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment
Reference (c)

cc: Chairman, TSCC
Director, PPB
Inspector General

DD/S Distribution:

- 1 - DD/S Subject
- 1 - Director of Security
- 1 - Director of Finance
- 1 - Director of Logistics ✓
- 1 - Director of Communications

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 3 April 1967
TO: 25X1A		
[REDACTED] EO-DD/S V		
ROOM NO. 7D18	BUILDING Headquarters	3 APR 1967
REMARKS:		
<p>Vernon:</p> <p>Attached per our telephone conversation of 31 March 1967 is the copy of the Executive Director-Comptroller's memorandum on technical surveillance countermeasures.</p> <p>25X1A</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>		
FROM: Deputy Director of Logistics		
ROOM NO. 1206	BUILDING Ames	EXTENSION 2551

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 29 MAR 1967
TO: Director of Logistics		
ROOM NO. 1206	BUILDING Ames	
REMARKS:		
<p>Jack,</p> <p>Per our telecon.</p> <p>V.T.</p>		
FROM: Deputy Director for Support		
ROOM NO. 7D18	BUILDING Hqs	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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